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ALL BETS ARE OFF: PREEMPTING MAJOR LEAGUE 
BA EBALL  MONO OL  ON SPORTS BETTING DATA 
Beatrice Lucas* 
Abstract: Major League Baseball is in the process of collectivizing data used in sports 
betting. This could be exempt from antitrust scrutiny if the conduct falls within the business 
of baseball.  Such an exemption raises the question of whether collecting official league data 
is sufficiently attenuated from the business of baseball  to be subject to antitrust law, and if 
so, whether MLB violates the Sherman Act by excluding competitors from the league data 
market. This Comment makes a two-fold argument. First, it argues that the business of 
baseball  should be constrained to cover activities directly linked to putting on baseball games. 
Second, this Comment argues that the collectivization of official league data for sports betting 
is not within the business of baseball,  and that MLB is potentially violating the Sherman Act 
for excluding competitors through anticompetitive means. The unique business of baseball  
exemption has existed for almost one hundred years without limit, but that does not mean 
professional baseball can restrain trade in every industry it deals.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
[B]aseball,  Justice Blackmun wrote, is our national pastime[,] or, 
depending []on [ our] point of view, the great American traged . 1 At its 
inception, baseball was a humble sport played by friends in an open field 
for fun.2 Today, Major League Baseball (MLB) is a ten billion dollar 
industry.3 And now, in the wake of a recent United States Supreme Court 
decision, MLB adds an additional revenue stream: collectivizing and 
selling game data used for sports betting.4  
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. I would like to thank 
Professor Douglas Ross for his invaluable guidance on antitrust law and help making this Comment 
possible. I would also like to thank the editorial staff of WLR for their helpful comments and 
suggestions, and of course my husband, Jonathan Lucas, for being my sounding board and support 
system. 
1. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 264 (1972) (internal citations omitted). 
2. See Gilbert P. Laue et al., Baseball, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/sports/baseball [https://perma.cc/W4NG-7Z8F]. 
3. Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record $10.7 Billion in Revenues for 2019, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2019, 
7:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/12/21/mlb-sees-record-107-billion-in-
revenues-for-2019/#3af151d85d78 [https://perma.cc/C526-GFMG?type=image]. 2019 was the 
seventeenth year in a row of record growth for the MLB. Id. 
4. See Matt Rybaltowski, Document Shows MLB Pitch for Sportsbooks to Become Official League 
Data Licensee,  SPORTS HANDLE (June 13, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/mlb-authorized-gaming-
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In 2018, the United States Supreme Court held the Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) unconstitutional,5 leaving states 
free to legalize sports betting.6 Twenty-one states and Washington, D.C. 
have legalized some form of sports betting to date.7 Twenty-three other 
states are working on legislation at the time of this Comment.8 
In an attempt to protect the integrit  of the game, 9 MLB has pushed 
to make official league data the game and player statistics compiled by 
MLB and its authorized partners the primary source of baseball statistics 
in sports betting.10 MLB s campaign has two components: lobb ing state 
governments and incentivizing sportsbooks to exclusively use official 
league data for sports betting.11 MLB began lobb ing before PASPA s 
overruling.12 Presently, MLB has convinced two states, Illinois and 
Tennessee, to pass laws mandating the exclusive use of official league 
data in sports betting.13 
MLB s efforts e tend to the private sector: namel , pitching for 
sportsbooks to become Authorized Gaming Operators (AGOs).14 
Sportsbooks serve as middleman in betting; they receive and distribute 
bets online and in person to facilitate the sports betting process.15 
Sportsbooks supply data to help bettors make an informed wager.16 If a 
sportsbook becomes an AGO, MLB assures customers that every person 
betting through that sportsbook will be using only official league data.17 
                                                 
operator-program/ [https://perma.cc/BW2T-C8B8]. 
5. See Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018). 
6. See Brett Smiley, Legal Sports Betting Bill Tracker, SPORTS HANDLE (Mar. 8, 2020), 
https://sportshandle.com/legal-betting-legislation-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/QP5V-9YRQ].  
7. Id.  
8. Id.  
9. James Drew, Major League Baseball Wants Cut of the Action if Washington Legalizes Sports 
Gambling, NEWS TRIBUNE (Oct. 11, 2019, 6:10 AM), https://www.thenewstribune.com/news/state/ 
washington/article236014943.html# (last accessed July 14, 2020). 
10. See Official League Data, LEGAL SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/official-
league-data/ [https://perma.cc/DR5X-NCPU]. 
11. See Rybaltowski, supra note 4; Rui Kenaya, The NBA and MLB Quietly Hustle for a Cut of the 
Sports Betting Jackpot, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (June 8, 2018, 1:07 PM), 
https://publicintegrity.org/politics/state-politics/the-nba-and-mlb-quietly-hustle-for-a-cut-of-the-
sports-betting-jackpot/ [https://perma.cc/YV9U-EDHD].  
12. See Official League Data, supra note 10. 
13. See id. 
14. See Rybaltowski, supra note 4. 
15. See Sportsbook, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/definition/sportsbook 
[https://perma.cc/LR4A-ZF8F]. Sportsbooks are essentially the middleman: they receive and 
distribute bets either online or in person. See id. 
16. See Official League Data, supra note 10. 
17. See Rybaltowski, supra note 4.  
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In return, MLB licenses AGOs to market with the official MLB logo and 
attain the credibility that comes with it.18  
However, collectivizing game data could violate section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, which prohibits competitors from acting in concert to 
unreasonably restrain trade.19 While lobbying the government for 
favorable laws remains beyond the reach of antitrust scrutiny,20 joint 
ventures that foreclose competition could push the conduct into section 1 
territory.21 Thirty teams make up MLB, each an individually operated 
entity.22 An agreement to sell official league data at a centralized level and 
exclude other collectors of game data potentially restrains trade in 
violation of the Sherman Act.23  
It is possible that MLB is acting as one legal entity, not as thirty distinct 
teams when it sells official league data, which would preclude a section 1 
claim. However, this defense could give rise to a section 2 claim, which 
outlaws monopolization and attempts to monopolize.24 If MLB s 
collectivization of game data provides it with a way to gain or maintain 
market power by excluding rivals such an act would bolster a 
section 2 claim.25 
On the other hand, it may not matter if MLB violated either section
even if MLB s conduct is a particularl  insidious restraint on trade. This 
is because MLB has uniquely benefited from an aberration in antitrust law 
                                                 
18. See id.; infra Part I.  
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 ( Ever  [agreement] . . . in restraint of trade . . . is declared to be illegal. ). 
20. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 555 56 (2014) (first 
citing E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); and then citing 
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)) (creating the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 
which stands for the proposition that defendants are immune from antitrust liability when petitioning 
the government for passage of favorable laws).  
21. See, e.g., Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984) (O Connor, J., 
concurring), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (holding that a 
tying arrangement did not violate antitrust law because the company lacked market power in the tying 
market). 
22. See Marc Edelman, Why the Single Entity  Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs: A Primer 
on Property-Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
891, 925 (2008); Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984) (discussing 
whether corporations are a single entity or several for antitrust purposes depending on if they have a 
complete unit  of interest ). 
23. The Court has long held that concerted action . . . does not turn simply on whether the parties 
are . . . legall  distinct entities  but instead favors a look at how the parties involved in the alleged 
anticompetitive conduct actuall  operate.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 191 (2010).  
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 ( Ever  person who shall monopoli e, or attempt to monopoli e, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony . . . . ). 
25. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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ever since Justice Holmes declared baseball a mere e hibition  and not 
interstate commerce.26 Both section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act 
require that the conduct constitutes interstate commerce, and federal 
antitrust law cannot regulate an e hibition[]. 27 In the line of cases 
following Holmes s fateful decision, so long as MLB s conduct remained 
within the business of baseball,  courts could not touch it.28 
Just how far the boundaries of the business of baseball  e tend 
remains unclear, including whether game data in sports betting falls under 
this exemption.29 If game data in sports betting does qualify, the 
exemption will continue to expand, raising the question as to when, if 
ever, it will be constrained.  
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part I explains the context of the 
sports betting industr  as it relates to MLB s conduct. Part II gives the 
legal background on the baseball exemption. Part III shows how the courts 
have grappled with the baseball exemption in a contemporary legal 
setting. Part IV proposes a limit to the baseball exemption that balances 
competing interests. Part V applies those confines to MLB s conduct. 
Part VI concludes that collectivizing official league data used for sports 
betting is not directl  linked to the business of baseball  and should be 
subject to antitrust scrutiny.  
 
I. SPORTS BETTING TODAY MLB S PATH ON 
PROPRIETARY GAME DATA 
Sports betting is a multibillion-dollar industry.30 After the Court ruled 
PASPA unconstitutional, MLB lobbied both state governments and 
sportsbooks to e clusivel  use MLB s proprietar  data. This market 
exclusivity would give MLB major profits to the detriment of 
healthy  competition.  
A. Sports Betting: A League of Its Own 
Sports betting allows consumers to not only place bets on the final 
                                                 
26. Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat l League of Pro. Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922).  
27. Id. at 207 09. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 2.  
28. Right Field Rooftops, LLC v. Chi. Cubs Baseball Club, LLC, 870 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 2017); 
Wyckoff v. Off. of the Comm r, 211 F. Supp. 3d 615, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff d, 705 F. App x 26 
(2d Cir. 2017). 
29. See Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 200.  
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outcome of a game but also discrete events such as, how many balls a 
pitcher will throw in the third inning, or if a specific player will hit a home 
run.31 Consumers can bet on sports either online or in person, depending 
on the laws of the state.32 Sportsbooks the casinos and organizations that 
accept and pay out wagers facilitate the betting process.33 For instance, 
a person wishing to bet on the upcoming Mariners game will either login 
to an online sportsbook or go to a casino, put money down for a specific 
outcome in the game, and reap the rewards if their bet pays off.34  
Baseball managers, scouts, and players rely on statistics more than their 
peers involved with other sports due to baseball s discrete outcomes and 
large sample size of relevant data.35 For the same reasons, this makes 
accurate and advanced baseball statistics particularly valuable to the 
sports bettor.36 MLB wants to be the sole provider of this data.37 
Monetizing the supply of league data to sportsbooks would generate a 
healthy revenue stream, especially given how lucrative sports betting 
currently is (and is predicted to be).38 If MLB gained an exclusive market 
in baseball data, independent data collectors could be driven out of the 
market and purveyors of sportsbooks could pay more for the same data. 
Ultimately, these costs may be passed on to consumers.  
                                                 
31. See Benjamin Cronin, How to Bet on Baseball: The Ultimate Baseball Betting Guide, 
PINNACLE (June 11, 2017), https://www.pinnacle.com/en/betting-articles/Baseball/ultimate-baseball-
betting-guide/JU3J9V9HPREQ3VMS [https://perma.cc/934F-ZHUL]. 
32. See Legal Sports Betting in the United States, DRAFTKINGS SPORTSBOOK, 
https://sportsbook.draftkings.com/help/sports-betting/where-is-sports-betting-legal 
[https://perma.cc/23UE-5FXM].  
33. See Brett Smiley, Sports Betting 101: NFL Lines, Odds, Point Spreads and More, SPORTS 
HANDLE (Aug. 9, 2017), https://sportshandle.com/football-betting-nfl-lines-odds-point-spreads-
explainer/ [https://perma.cc/2U2U-TWHX]. 
34. A bettor may bet on which team will win the World Series before gameplay has begun (futures 
bets), whether a certain player will hit a homerun against a specified team (props bets), or the total 
number of runs scored in a specific game (totals bets). See How to Bet on Baseball, DRAFTKINGS 
SPORTSBOOK, https://sportsbook.draftkings.com/help/how-to-bet/baseball-betting-guide 
[https://perma.cc/5MLV-EJ8B]. 
35. See Louis Menand, What Baseball Teaches Us About Measuring Talent, NEW YORKER (Apr. 
1,  2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/04/08/what-baseball-teaches-us-about-
measuring-talent [https://perma.cc/MP26-S2NP] (showing the history of scouting baseball talent and 
its relation to statistics). 
36. See id.  
37. See Rybaltowski, supra note 4. 
38. See Matt Rybaltowski, Here s How Much Official  League Data Actually Costs, SPORTS 
HANDLE (Mar. 12, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-official-data-cost/ 
[https://perma.cc/H956-X3ME] (finding that the cost is $4,000 to $6,000 a month per sportsbook with 
steep increases for additional games and in-game betting statistics). 
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B. MLB s Pitch: Aggressi e Lobb ing and an Incenti e Program 
In May 2018, the Supreme Court declared the PASPA 
unconstitutional lifting the restriction on sports betting s legali ation.39 
MLB spent months preparing in anticipation of this decision.40 During its 
multistate lobb ing blit ,  MLB spared no e pense to retain lobb ing 
services for every state that expected to legalize sports betting if and when 
PASPA was overruled.41 MLB s goal was simple to receive a slice of 
the profits.42 Experts expect the United States sports betting industry to 
generate more than $41 billion annually.43 
MLB first lobbied state governments to mandate that consumers only 
use official league data when placing bets.44 Because lobbying the 
government is for the most part lawful, no matter how anticompetitive, 
this does not implicate antitrust laws.45 MLB s bet paid off when both 
Illinois and Tennessee passed legislation mandating official league data 
as the only data allowed in sports betting.46 
Beyond extensive lobbying efforts, MLB has also been working in the 
private sector to secure deals with sportsbooks that would authorize them 
to become AGOs.47 If a sportsbook agrees to use official league data, 
MLB provides it with use of the MLB logo, media and content e tension 
opportunities,  and product integration through MLB.TV. 48 In return, 
MLB receives either a flat fee or a percentage of the revenues, depending 
on the size of the sportsbook.49 Four sportsbooks have already joined the 
                                                 
39. See Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018). PASPA was struck down 
for violating the anti-commandeering doctrine; it unequivocall  dictate[d] what a state legislature 
may and may not do.  Id.  
40. See Rui Kenaya, The NBA and MLB Quietly Hustle for a Cut of the Sports Betting Jackpot, 
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (June 8, 2018), https://publicintegrity.org/politics/state-politics/the-nba-
and-mlb-quietly-hustle-for-a-cut-of-the-sports-betting-jackpot/ [https://perma.cc/YV9U-EDHD].  
41. Id. 
42. See id.  
43. OXFORD ECONS., supra note 30.  
44. See Brett Smiley, Antitrust Tripwires: Legal Expert Explains Sports Betting Data Issues, 
SPORTS HANDLE (June 4, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-data-antitrust/ 
[https://perma.cc/PP97-MMJ6].  
45. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 555 56 (2014). 
46. See Tennessee Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Dec. 10, 2019, 2:31 PM), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/tn/ [https://perma.cc/B96E-9NDQ]; Official League Data, supra 
note 10.  
47. See Rybaltowski, supra note 4. 
48. Id. 
49. See id. Apparently, Nevada sportsbooks do not need official league data to turn a profit: they 
earned more than $47.1 million on baseball wagers in 2018. Id. 
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AGO program.50  
The fight over data primaril  concerns in-pla  betting  (or live 
betting ) rather than the outcome of an  single game.51 For example, a 
bettor could use this data to place a bet on if the next pitch will be a strike 
or whether Mike Trout will hit a home run in the bottom of the eighth 
inning against the Yankees.52 Sports betting cannot exist on an even-
playing field absent accurate data; if two people bet on the same pitch, 
each relying on different, conflicting sources, the result could be unfair.   
MLB wants both state legislatures and sportsbooks to believe that 
official league data remains superior to its unofficial counterpart and is 
therefore fairer to consumers. Multiple sources suggest otherwise.53 
Marquest Meeks, MLB s senior counsel for sports betting and 
investigation, claims that official league data is the only reliable source of 
data and that using unofficial data risks delay and inaccuracy.54 Meeks 
also asserts that pirated  data data collected at games by individuals
runs the risk of corrupting the game.55 He believes an unofficial data 
source could try to fix games by bribing players to influence one result or 
the other.56  
However, studies show that apart from the minor difference in the 
data s transmission speed, little else differentiates official game data from 
unofficial.57 Further, some experts argue that speedier data transmission 
                                                 
50. Matt Rybaltowski, FOX Bet Becomes an MLB Authorized Gaming Operator Days Before 
World Series, SPORTS HANDLE (Oct. 15, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/fox-bet-mlb-authorized-
gaming-operator/ [https://perma.cc/42XH-HUYN]. Those sportsbooks are FOX Bet, MGM Resorts 
International, DraftKings, and FanDuel. Id.  
51. Official League Data, supra note 10. The outcome of a game can be determined by anyone and 
does not rely on complex data. See id.  
52. See MLB Betting Guide: How to Bet on Baseball, ODDS SHARK, 
https://www.oddsshark.com/mlb/how-bet-baseball [https://perma.cc/RA83-SN8T].  
53. See Official League Data, supra note 10; Brett Smiley, How Unofficial  Sports Betting Data 
May Be Better than Official League Data,  SPORTS HANDLE (June 5, 2019), 
https://sportshandle.com/unofficial-official-league-data/ [https://perma.cc/H8W7-DEBP] (making 
the argument that unofficial data can be a better experience and more accurate than official league 
data); Official and Unofficial Data in Sports Betting: Comparison and Evaluation, SLOTEGRATOR 
(Oct.  1,  2019)  [hereinafter  Official  and  Unofficial  Data], https://slotegrator.pro/analytical_artic 
les/official-and-unofficial-data-in-sports-betting-comparison-and-evaluation/ 
[https://perma.cc/85K8-JBZN] (finding little else except speed of data transmission to differentiate 
official from unofficial data).  
54. See Drew, supra note 9. 
55. Id.  
56. See id. For example, an unofficial data source could theoretically pay a player to strike out in 
the sixth inning so that those who had placed that bet could profit. See id. 
57. See Official and Unofficial Data, supra note 53 (the source of the data is also mentioned as a 
difference between official and unofficial data).  
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is not necessarily better; high speed leaves less time for accuracy checks.58 
Even if the data is inaccurate, the market would presumably correct for 
this. Sportsbooks will have an incentive to buy the highest quality data for 
the lowest price, and data that is disreputable will naturally fall out of 
the market. 
In a media briefing, Kenny Gersh, the MLB executive of gaming and 
new business ventures, stated that sportsbooks without official league data 
won t be around for long. 59 This statement indicates that MLB is aware 
that it is engaging in exclusionary conduct, which is the basis for many 
antitrust claims.60 But even if MLB s conduct is e clusionar , it is 
possibl  without consequence because of baseball s antitrust e emption.  
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASEBALL EXEMPTION 
MLB s antitrust e emption is as unusual in the legal world as an eephus 
pitch:61 it is a protection for the business of baseball  that emerged in the 
landmark Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional 
Baseball Clubs62 decision by the Supreme Court over 100 years ago. 63 
Federal Baseball was the first in a trilogy of cases establishing the 
baseball exemption.64 Toda , it remains the basis of man  courts  
decisions involving baseball antitrust cases. 
A. Relevant Antitrust Law for the Intersection of Sports Betting and 
MLB 
Plaintiffs often bring antitrust actions alleging both a section 1 and 
section 2 claim. The key difference between the claims is whether or not 
the actor works in concert with others. 
                                                 
58. See id.  
59. Martin Derbyshire, Why It s Doubtful That Legal Sportsbooks Will Go Under Without MLB 
Data, PLAYUSA (July 5, 2019), https://www.playusa.com/major-league-baseball-official-data-scare-
tactic/ [https://perma.cc/NB3E-JY2U]. A year earlier in a panel on sports betting, Mr. Gersh implied 
that unofficial data comes from some gu  in a garage who is watching the game on TV.  John 
Brennan, MLB and AGA Execs Cross Swords in Fiery Sports Betting Panel at G2E, US BETS (Oct. 
11, 2018), https://www.usbets.com/g2e-fiery-sports-betting-panel/ [https://perma.cc/DQT4-VMGX].  
60. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595 96 (1985) 
(holding that a ski resort s refusal to cooperate with competitors could be considered monopoli ation 
under section 2 of the Sherman Act if the refusal has no legitimate business purpose).  
61. Eephus Pitch, MLB.COM, http://m.mlb.com/glossary/pitch-types/eephus 
[https://perma.cc/B56L-FVJ7]. An eephus pitch is an e tremel  rare t pe of pitch that is known for 
its e ceptionall  low speed and abilit  to catch a hitter off guard.  Id. 
62. 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
63. Id. 
64. See id.; Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
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1. Applicability of Sherman Act, Section 1 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that [e]ver  contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce . . . is . . . illegal. 65 Some restraints of trade are so nakedly 
anticompetitive that they require per se condemnation.66 Restraints that do 
not qualif  as naked  often result in a burden-shifting analysis.67 Once a 
plaintiff shows likely harm to consumers, the defendant may rebut that 
presumption with a plausible and legally cognizable competitive 
justification for the restraint.68 When the anticompetitive effects outweigh 
the procompetitive justifications, the conduct is an unreasonable restraint 
on trade.69  
A section 1 claim requires concerted action that takes the form of a 
contract, combination, or conspiracy.70 Competitors act in concert when 
the  form an agreement as separate economic actors,  pursue separate 
economic interests,  and their agreement deprives the market of a 
diversit  of entrepreneurial interests. 71  
Joint ventures are generally considered a procompetitive model, 
especiall  when the  increase a firm s efficienc  and enable it to compete 
more effectively.72 However, joint ventures can harm competition in 
smaller markets b  allowing one supplier to unreasonabl  . . . deprive 
other suppliers of a market for their goods. 73 The Court applied this legal 
principle in McWane, Inc. v. FTC74 when a pipe manufacturer required its 
                                                 
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1.  
66. See, e.g., Nat l Soc y of Pro. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (holding that an 
agreement within a professional organization to not quote a price until after the client had chosen an 
engineer was per se illegal because it eliminated the possibility of engineers competing with one 
another).  
67. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
68. See id. at 35 36.  
69. See id.  
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 1; In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 315 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(explaining that concerted action requires a unit  of purpose or a common design and understanding 
or a meeting of minds  or a conscious commitment to a common scheme  (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
71. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 195 (2010).  
72. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); Race Tires Am., Inc. 
v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 76 (3d Cir. 2010). 
73. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984) (O Connor, J., concurring), 
abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); see also IIIB PHILIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 760b7, at 55 (4th ed. 2015) (explaining that a 
dominant firm can use e clusive deals to strengthen[] or prolong[] [its] market position ).  
74. McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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distributors to buy exclusively from it foreclosing competitors from 
entering the market and competing effectively to unlawfully maintain 
its monopoly.75  
A joint venture will likely pass antitrust scrutiny if the firms have an 
agreement aimed at a common economic goal.76 But characterizing an 
agreement among competitors as a joint venture will not save it from 
condemnation.77 A lawful joint venture differs from an unlawful one 
based on the anticompetitive consequences that result.78 An unlawful 
venture might possess absolute control over supply, impose production 
limits, and punish cartel members who stray from the quotas.79 A lawful 
business agreement will have procompetitive elements such as increasing 
output or enhancing product quality.80  
A defense to unlawful concerted action is if the defendant claims that 
the alleged competitors  actuall  constitute a single entit  and therefore 
cannot act in concert.81 American Needle v. National Football League82 
examined the single entity defense in the context of football. The thirty 
distinct National Football League (NFL) teams claimed that they acted as 
a single entity through the NFL when they exclusively licensed 
intellectual property.83 The Court focused on the competitive realit ,  
rather than the NFL teams  legal status as distinct entities.84 The NFL 
teams were distinct entities because the teams competed with each other 
not just in games but in ticket sales, to attract fans, and for contracts with 
players and managerial personnel.85 The NFL teams did not have common 
objectives, and therefore the  were separate economic actors pursuing 
separate economic interests. 86  
                                                 
75. See id. at 837. Foreclosure occurs when the opportunity for competitors to enter the market is 
significantl  limited.  Id. 
76. See Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 195. 
77. See FED. TRADE COMM N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG 
COMPETITORS 9 (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/joint-
venture-hearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-among-competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DE76-7LBV]. If it were an  other wa , an  cartel could evade the antitrust laws 
simpl  b  creating a joint venture  to serve as the e clusive seller of their competing products.  MLB 
Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 335 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
78. See Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 197. 
79. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 95 96 (1984).  
80. See MLB Props., 542 F.3d at 302 03. 
81. Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 191.   
82. 560 U.S. 183 (2010).  
83. See id. at 188. 
84. Id. at 196 97. 
85. See id.  
86. Id. at 197.  
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Whether actors are a single entity or not requires an analysis into each 
specific industry.87 In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System, Inc.,88 the defendants each sold copyrighted music to purchasers 
under blanket licenses, in addition to selling individual licenses for each 
composition.89 The blanket licenses constituted agreements among 
competitors on price, but they also created efficiencies.90 Because the 
blanket licenses lowered costs and made it easier for both buyers and 
sellers to do business, the agreements were not per se illegal.91  
MLB could similarly defend itself from a section 1 claim because the 
AGO program increases efficiency and sportsbooks would have no need 
to buy data from one team and not the other.92 Even if this defense 
succeeds, it would not preclude a section 2 claim.93 
2. Applicability of Sherman Act, Section 2 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to monopoli e, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopoli e. 94 The offense of attempted monopolization 
requires a dangerous probability that the defendant will achieve market 
power.95 The offense of actual monopolization requires that the defendant 
have market power.96 Both offenses require that a plaintiff prove that the 
defendant engaged in anticompetitive conduct to obtain or maintain that 
market power.97  
Market power is the ability to raise prices above a competitive level.98 
Direct proof of market power rarely exists, meaning that courts must look 
for circumstantial evidence in the market structure; such as the 
                                                 
87. See id. at 195.  
88. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).  
89. See id. at 5 6.  
90. See id. at 21 22. 
91. See id.  
92. See infra Part V. 
93. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 195 (2010). 
94. 15 U.S.C. § 2.  
95. See, e.g., Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that 
territorial restrictions in the grocery store market were a per se violation of the Sherman Act).  
96. See id. ( Despite the similar approaches, a lesser degree of market power ma  establish an 
attempted monopolization claim than that necessary to establish a completed monopolization 
claim. ). 
97. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
98. See id. at 51.  
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defendant s share in the relevant market.99 There is no precise share of the 
market that is required to constitute a monopoly: 65% might be enough, 
and 80% certainly is.100 A claim of attempted monopolization requires less 
market power than a monopolization claim.101  
It is not unlawful under section 2 to have a monopoly because of a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. 102 A court will 
look at whether the competitive process itself has been harmed when it 
differentiates legitimate business practices from anticompetitive conduct; 
harm to competitors alone is not sufficient for a section 2 claim.103 
Further, the defendant s actions must cause the harm.104 As in a section 1 
claim, the defendant may offer procompetitive justifications, and the 
plaintiff will attempt to show that the anticompetitive harm outweighs 
those justifications.105  
Commentators do not often mention the need for the conduct in a 
section 1 or 2 claim to affect interstate commerce. Because interstate 
commerce is so loosely defined, it is almost never a deciding factor in an 
antitrust case.106 However, one exception remains Federal Baseball.107  
B. [P]ersonal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of 
commerce. 108 
Justice Holmes created the baseball exemption in Federal Baseball 
                                                 
99. See id. Circumstantial evidence might be the defendant s dominant share of a relevant market  
that has entry barriers, such as regulatory requirements. Id. 
100. See, e.g., Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir. 1997) 
( Courts generall  require a 65% market share to establish a prima facie case of market power. ); 
Morgenstern v. Wilson, 29 F.3d 1291, 1296 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994) (explaining that 80% market share is 
sufficient).  
101. See generally United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). In United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., the D.C. Circuit held that Microsoft had monopolist market power because 
it had greater than 95% of the market and entry barriers were high, among other things. 253 F.3d 34, 
54 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Entry barriers were that consumers preferred to use a reputable browser and 
developers typically want to write applications for browsers that will be used by the most consumers. 
Id. 
102. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). 
103. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58. 
104. See id. at 58 59. 
105. See id. at 59. In Microsoft, the Court upheld evidence of anticompetitive conduct because 
Microsoft had among other anticompetitive practices reduced its rivals  browser share usage by 
preventing the manufacturers from accommodating the browsers with no efficiency justification. See 
id. at 62. 
106. See Summit Health Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 330 (1991) (explaining that plaintiffs need 
not prove that interstate commerce itself has been affected but rather that potential harm would ensue).  
107. 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
108. Id. at 209. 
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when he held that baseball does not constitute interstate commerce.109 A 
century ago, when Justice Holmes wrote his opinion in Federal Baseball, 
three leagues existed: the Federal League, the National League, and the 
American League.110 The Federal League folded in 1915, largely due to 
interference from the other leagues.111 The teams in the Federal League 
sued the American and National Leagues for conspiracy to monopolize 
baseball.112 The teams in the Federal League sued the American and 
National Leagues for conspiracy to monopolize baseball.113 All parties 
eventuall  settled e cept for the Federal League s Baseball Club of 
Baltimore.114 The Baseball Club of Baltimore alleged that the other 
leagues monopolized all of the available baseball talent and caused the 
inevitable collapse of the Federal League.115 
Justice Holmes drew a meticulous distinction for defining 
commerce.116 The transportation of a product or service across state lines 
was not subject to the Commerce Clause if the commerce  was personal 
effort unrelated to production.117 Money moving across state lines for an 
entertainment event like baseball was onl  incident[al]  to that event and 
not the essential thing. 118 Justice Holmes analogized to a lawyer 
traveling to another state to argue a case; the transportation to participate 
in commerce was ancillary to the main commercial event, and therefore 
not under the umbrella of the Clause.119 However, the Court s subsequent 
interpretations of the Commerce Clause soon made this 
ruling untenable.120  
                                                 
109. Id.  
110. See Laue, supra note 2; Gary Hailey, Anatomy of a Murder: The Federal League and the 
Courts, OUR GAME (June 22, 2015), https://ourgame.mlblogs.com/anatomy-of-a-murder-the-federal-
league-and-the-courts-de9889130b0a [https://perma.cc/PDY6-N3GM]. 
111. See Hailey, supra note 110.  
112. See id. 
113. See id. 
114. See id.  
115. See Nat l League of Pro. Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club, Inc., 269 F. 681, 683 (D.C. 
Cir. 1920).  
116. Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat l League of Pro. Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922). 
This distinction was insisted upon  because of Hooper v. California, a case involving insurance 
agents, who were not engaged in interstate commerce because their travel was only incidental to their 
work. Id. (citing Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 655 (1895)).  
117. Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 209.  
118. Id.  
119. See id.  
120. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (growing wheat that never left the 
grower s property was able to be regulated by the Commerce Clause because it indirectly affected 
interstate commerce). 
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Today, virtually any trade affects commerce, from homegrown 
cannabis121 to the Utah prairie dog.122 Accordingly, Federal Baseball is 
now out of step with almost every interpretation as to what constitutes 
interstate commerce yet the exception is still good law.123 
C. The Court Doubles Down on the Baseball Exemption 
Despite the discrepancy in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court 
reaffirmed the baseball exemption thirty-one years later in Toolson v. New 
York Yankees.124 This one-paragraph, per curiam opinion refused to depart 
from Federal Baseball.125 Without considering the merits of the case, the 
Court stated that Congress had no intention of including the business of 
baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws  and that if there 
are evils in this field [of baseball] which now warrant application to it of 
the antitrust laws it should be b  legislation. 126 This opinion solidified 
the baseball exemption in antitrust law.127  
Justice Burton dissented, reasoning that baseball would fall under the 
definition of interstate commerce established since Federal Baseball.128 
Instead of viewing congressional inaction as acquiescence to the baseball 
exemption, Justice Burton thought congressional inaction made it 
unreasonable to find that the baseball exemption exists.129 
By 1953, these two Supreme Court cases totaling six paragraphs
established and reaffirmed the baseball exemption.130 Instead of reversing 
                                                 
121. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).  
122. See People for Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 
990, 994 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 649 (2018). 
123. See Legal Info. Inst., Commerce Clause, CORNELL L. SCH., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/commerce_clause [https://perma.cc/6E4R-F8X7] ( From the 
NLRB decision in 1937 until 1995, the Supreme Court did not invalidate a single law on the basis of 
the Commerce Clause. ). 
124. 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam).  
125. See id. at 357.  
126. Id.  
127. See Miranda v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2017).  
128. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 360. 
129. See id. at 364 65.  
130. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941) (finding that Congress could 
regulate activities that merely affected interstate commerce). In a Second Circuit opinion concerning 
whether employment relations with umpires falls under the baseball exemption (they do), Judge 
Friendly acknowledged that Federal Baseball was not one of Mr. Justice Holmes  happiest da s, 
that the rationale of Toolson is e tremel  dubious,  and that the distinction between baseball and 
other professional sports was unrealistic, inconsistent and illogical.  Salerno v. Am. League of Pro. 
Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970).  
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course, the Court threw the third strike in Flood v. Kuhn.131 After Curtis 
Flood played twelve seasons for the St. Louis Cardinals,132 the team traded 
him to the Philadelphia Phillies without his knowledge or consent.133 
Opposing the trade, Flood asked the Commissioner to make him a free 
agent.134 When the Commissioner denied his request, he challenged the 
reserve clause under antitrust laws.135 
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority of the Court, chose to follow 
the established  line of cases rather than depart from them.136 He 
acknowledged that professional baseball engages in interstate commerce, 
Federal Baseball and Toolson have become an aberration confined to 
baseball,  and if change was to be made it should be b  legislation.137 He 
reasoned that the law had been allowed to develop since 1922, and that, 
by not acting, Congress had signaled its intention to keep the exemption 
in baseball.138 Further, overruling Federal Baseball would result in 
confusion and issues of retroactivity for the legislature.139 The Court 
recognized the inconsistency and illogic of this line of cases but reasoned 
that to hold otherwise would invalidate Congress s positive inaction.140 
Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall wrote dissenting opinions.141 
Justice Douglas took part in the majority of Toolson but believed this 
decision was a fundamental error and lived to regret it.142 Justice 
Douglas s dissent in Flood was clear: [Federal Baseball] . . . is a derelict 
in the stream of law that we, its creator, should remove. 143 Justice 
                                                 
131. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
132. Id. at 264. Flood batted over .300 for six of his twelve years with the Cardinals, participated 
in three World Series, and won seven Golden Glove awards. Id.  
133. See id. at 265.  
134. Id. In the letter to the Commissioner Flood stated, After twelve ears in the Major Leagues, 
I do not feel I am a piece of propert  to be bought and sold irrespective of m  wishes.  Howard Burns, 
Curtis Flood s Sacrifice: Sports  Most Meaningful Trade, BLEACHER REP. (July 13, 2011), 
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/766021-curt-floods-sacrifice-sports-most-meaningful-trade 
[https://perma.cc/2N4Y-T44M]. 
135. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 265. A reserve clause gives a baseball club the exclusive right to renew 
a contract with a player and bind them to the contract until traded or retired. See Reserve clause, THE 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2016). 
136. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. 
137. Id. at 282 83.  
138. See id.  
139. See id.  
140. See id. at 283 84.  
141. See id. at 286, 288.  
142. See id. at 286 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
143. Id. at 286.  
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Douglas lamented that baseball pla ers were victims  of the reserve 
clause, and that this practice is commonl  called an unreasonable 
restraint of trade. 144 Instead of viewing congressional inaction as the 
reason to uphold Federal Baseball, he said the Court should read into the 
fact that Congress has not exempted professional sports as a whole from 
antitrust law.145  
In his dissent, Justice Marshall focused on the importance of antitrust 
law, reminding ever one that the Sherman Act remains the Magna Carta 
of free enterprise. 146 Like Douglas, Marshall believed that Congress s 
inaction did not signal a green light for the baseball exemption, but simply 
that Congress s concern had not risen enough to elicit action.147 He 
reasoned that the Court itself unnecessarily distinguished professional 
baseball players and it should be the Court that fixes this injustice.148  
After Flood, the baseball exemption solidified into firm precedent that 
the Court refused to e pand past baseball s confines to other sports or 
entertainment.149 Both United States v. Shubert150 and United States v. 
International Boxing Club of New York151 rejected creating an antitrust 
exemption similar to that of baseball. Chief Justice Warren wrote the 
majority opinion in both. In Shubert, he called Toolson a narrow 
application of the rule of stare decisis, 152 and in International Boxing he 
stated that following Federal Baseball is not compelled solely because 
boxing is a professional sport.153 Stare decisis is the linchpin of the 
baseball cases. Baseball s unique legal standard governs to this day, 
despite many Justices recognizing its illogic.154 
                                                 
144. Id. at 287.  
145. See id. at 288.  
146. Id. at 291 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 
596, 610 (1972)).  
147. See id. at 292.  
148. See id. at 292 93.  
149. See United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 230 31 (1955) (traveling theater companies); 
United States v. Int l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 242 (1955) (professional boxing); Radovich v. NFL, 
352 U.S. 445, 451 52 (1957) (professional football); Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971) 
(professional basketball). 
150. 348 U.S. 222 (1955).  
151. 348 U.S. 236 (1955).  
152. See Shubert, 348 U.S. at 282 (emphasis in original).  
153. See Int l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. at 241. In Radovich v. NFL, Justice Clark wrote that Federal 
Baseball applies to baseball only. 352 U.S. 445, 451 52 (1957). Because professional football had 
substantial interstate activity, it was clearly subject to antitrust law. See id. The Court recognized this 
same principle in Haywood v. NBA, and called arguments for exemptions in other professional sports 
foreclosed.  401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971). 
154. See supra section I.B. 
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III. THE CONTEMPORARY BASEBALL EXEMPTION 
Recent cases have challenged the baseball exemption. The courts have 
grappled with applications of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 (CFA),155 as well 
as with finding the boundar  of the business of baseball.  But neither 
line of cases establishes a workable test. Additionally, Congressional 
legislation has not established a clear boundar  for the business of 
baseball  as it pertains to antitrust law.  
A. Legislation at Last? 
Congress has passed one piece of legislation concerning the baseball 
exemption: the CFA.156 The CFA codified an agreement between MLB 
owners and the pla ers  union in the wake of the 1994 pla ers  strike that 
led to the cancellation of the World Series that year.157 The original 
version repealed the entire baseball exemption except for specific, narrow 
applications; such as the reserve clause in Minor League Baseball, 
franchising agreements, and public broadcasting agreements.158 However, 
the original version never went to a vote.159  
Shortl  thereafter, MLB and the pla ers  union jointl  drafted their 
own version of the legislation and submitted it to the Senate for 
consideration.160 Rather than completely abandoning the baseball 
exemption, the new bill made it clear that it onl  altered the antitrust laws  
applicabilit  with regard to the pla ers  emplo ment.161 This version of 
the CFA passed.162  
The CFA officially removed major league baseball employment 
contracts from the antitrust exemption, but ensured that almost everything 
else about the law had not changed.163 It specifically stated that it did not 
cover an  conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons not in the 
                                                 
155. 15 U.S.C. § 26b. 
156. Id.  
157. See Nathaniel Grow, The Curiously Confounding Curt Flood Act, 90 TUL. L. REV. 859, 872
73 (2016). 
158. See id. at 880.  
159. See id. at 881. 
160. See id. at 882.  
161. See id. at 883. [T]he revised draft also included a new introductor  section stating that the 
legislation s purpose was to clarif  that major league baseball pla ers are covered under the antitrust 
laws  without changing the application of the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect to 
an  other person or entit .  Id.  
162. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a) (b).  
163. See id. § 26b(b).  
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business of organi ed professional major league baseball,  leaving it to 
the courts to continue figuring out what exactly is the business 
of baseball.164 
Courts have found the CFA unhelpful in interpreting what constitutes 
the business of baseball.  In Laumann v. National Hockey League,165 
television and internet subscribers brought a putative class action against 
MLB and other sports broadcasters alleging that their territorial 
restrictions on broadcasting violated the Sherman Act.166 MLB claimed 
the antitrust exemption as a defense.167 The district court recognized that 
the scope of the antitrust e emption is far from clear  but declined to 
extend the exemption to anything not central to the business of baseball.168 
The court noted that the CFA was not applicable to this case because it 
only applied to employment contracts, but did not if media falls under the 
business of baseball.169 In this case, television broadcasting was inherently 
interstate commerce and it did not fall under Federal Baseball s 
exemption.170 The court indicated that subsequent interpretations should 
construe the exemption narrowly, and apply it only to the 
reserve clause.171  
Conversel , some courts have interpreted the CFA as Congress s 
explicit acceptance of the baseball exemption.172 In City of San Jose v. 
Office of the Commissioner of Baseball,173 San Jose sued MLB for alleged 
attempts to stymie the relocation efforts of the Oakland Athletics.174 The 
Athletics wanted to relocate to San Jose, but franchising agreements 
prohibited the move because San Jose fell within San Francisco Giants 
territory.175 The Ninth Circuit found that the antitrust exemption 
precluded San Jose s claims because the location of baseball clubs is the 
league s basic organi ing principle. 176 As such, it is part of the business 
of baseball  and it is not the court s place to interfere.177 Further, the court 
                                                 
164. Id. § 26b(b)(6). 
165. 56 F. Supp. 3d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  
166. Id. at 285.  
167. See id. at 295. 
168. Id. at 295 97. 
169. See id. 
170. See id. at 295.  
171. See id. at 295 96.  
172. See City of San Jose v. Off. of the Comm r of Baseball, 776 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 2015).  
173. 776 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 2015).  
174. See id. at 688. 
175. See id.  
176. Id. at 690 91.  
177. See id. at 690. 
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interpreted the CFA as clear evidence of congressional acquiescence to 
the baseball exemption because Congress refused to legislate against it.178 
Ultimately these cases demonstrate that the CFA does not add much, if 
anything, to clarify the baseball exemption. If this is the legislation the 
Court held out for, perhaps it misplaced its confidence in Congress.   
B. Recent Cases Attempt to Find the Bo ndaries of the B siness of 
Baseball  E emption 
Three recent circuit court cases addressed the baseball exemption but 
none provided any clear guidance as to its boundaries. In Right Field 
Rooftops, LLC v. Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC,179 owners of 
rooftop-businesses outside Wrigley Field sued the Chicago Cubs claiming 
they monopolized their baseball games when they erected signs that 
blocked the rooftops  view of the games.180 The court held that erecting 
signage that blocked the stadium was not attenuated to the business of 
baseball. 181 Rather, it was part and parcel  of providing baseball games 
for profit and was therefore exempt.182 
Wyckoff v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball183 involved a dispute 
about the employment relations between baseball scouts and the baseball 
clubs.184 The court held that the antitrust exemption applied because the 
scouts  emplo ment was central to the business of baseball, rather than 
incidental  or wholl  collateral. 185 Because scouts pla ed a direct and 
critical  role in selecting teams  pla ers, the  also pla ed a crucial role in 
determining the success of those teams.186 This, too, fell squarely within 
the business of baseball. 187 
In Miranda v. Selig,188 a class of minor league players brought an 
antitrust suit against the Commissioner of Baseball and the thirty baseball 
clubs claiming that the reserve clauses in the minor league pla ers  
                                                 
178. See id. at 690 91. 
179. 870 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2621 (2018). 
180. Id. at 687.  
181. Id. at 689.  
182. Id. at 689.  
183. 211 F. Supp. 3d 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff d, 705 F. App x 26 (2d Cir. 2017). 
184. Id. at 616.  
185. Id. at 626.  
186. Id. 
187. Id.  
188. 860 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2017).  
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employment contracts unduly restrained competition.189 After extensively 
reviewing precedent, the court found it undeniabl  true  that the 
emplo ment of minor league pla ers falls squarel  within  the baseball 
exemption.190 Although the minor league teams encouraged the court to 
break from stare decisis, the court refused, stating that circuit courts must 
follow the Supreme Court lest anarch  . . . prevail. 191 
The circuit courts remain reluctant to break from the Supreme Court s 
trilogy of baseball cases. The Second and Seventh Circuits indicate that 
there is a line across which conduct related to baseball would land afoul 
of the business of baseball precisely where that line is remains unclear. 
The lack of clarity will continue until either the Court acts or Congress 
passes legislation that addresses the full scope of the exemption. 
IV. MLB S UNIQUE EXEMPTION SHOULD BE CONSTRAINED  
Logic does not support baseball s e emption from antitrust law. Nor is 
it without consequences; the exemption presents measurable harm. 
Instead of leaving it unconstrained, the test for whether conduct is within 
the business of baseball  should be simplified and articulated. This 
Comment presents the following solution: if the conduct is directly related 
to putting on baseball games, it should be exempt from antitrust law.  
A. The Harm of the Exemption 
The baseball exemption would be of little consequence if it did not 
harm competition, and thus consumers. But ample evidence of harm does 
exist. For example, MLB compensates minor league players so poorly that 
their salaries fall well below the poverty line.192 Conversely, Major 
League pla ers  emplo ment contracts are not e empted from antitrust 
law because of the CFA; on average these players earn $4 million a 
year.193 As a result, most minor league players arguably the backbone 
of MLB s billion-dollar enterprise194 make less than $10,000 a year, are 
                                                 
189. Id. at 1239.  
190. Id. at 1242.  
191. Id. at 1243 (quoting Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982)). 
192. See Theodore McDowell, Comment, Changing the Game: Remedying the Deficiencies of 
Baseball s Antitrust Exemption in the Minor Leagues, 9 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 4 (2018). 
Minor league players were purposefully left out of the CFA, and the Save America s Pastime Act 
swiped their minimum wage protections. Patrick Pinak, Minor League Players Earn Less than School 
Janitors, FANBUZZ (May 15, 2020), https://fanbuzz.com/mlb/minor-league-baseball-salary/ 
[https://perma.cc/8JDW-5J56?type=image].  
193. Pinak, supra note 192.  
194. See Robbie Stratakos, Minor League Players Are the Ones Suffering from MLB s Standstill, 
BASEBALL ESSENTIAL (June 4, 2020), https://www.baseballessential.com/news/2020/06/04/minor-
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not paid for overtime, and often must work extra jobs to support 
themselves financially.195 If Minor Leaguers could use antitrust law to 
argue for better wages, then they could bargain for higher salaries instead 
of being forced to accept what is offered. 
Another example of harm, as shown in City of San Jose, is that MLB 
forbids teams from relocating too close to another existing franchise.196 
This allows each area with a major league baseball team to develop a 
monopoly on the area and raise ticket prices without fear 
of competition.197  
Lastly, although not exhaustively, MLB has set up territorial 
broadcasting restrictions so that consumers cannot watch their home team 
if they are in the franchise area of that team.198 If you wanted to watch a 
baseball game in Seattle, even if you pay $119 per year for MLB.TV, you 
cannot watch the Mariners unless you also have purchased a cable 
subscription.199 In these ways, the baseball exemption has undoubtedly 
caused harm to consumers. 
B. Clarifying the Standard 
How does a court determine whether conduct falls within the business 
of baseball ? Courts have cited and adhered to Toolson s business of 
baseball  standard religiousl ,200 but its vague standard offers no guidance 
for judges, litigants, or MLB on how to conduct such an analysis. The 
business of baseball  is especiall  outdated now that baseball has 
evolved beyond a pastoral game between friends and into a multibillion-
dollar enterprise.201 Baseball has entered the technological age along with 
everything else; MLB has its own television service, seven applications, 
countless merchandise, and now, a presence in the sports betting 
                                                 
league-players-are-the-ones-suffering-from-mlbs-standstill/ [https://perma.cc/97RF-PXSW]. 
195. See id.  
196. See City of San Jose v. Off. of the Comm r of Baseball, 776 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 2015).  
197. See Ari Khuner Haber, Comment, Keeping the A s in Oakland: Franchise Relocation, City of 
San Jose, and the Broad Power of Baseball s Antitrust Exemption, 22 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 26 27 
(2014).  
198. What is MLB.TV s Blackout Policy?, MLB.TV, https://www.mlb.com/live-stream-
games/help-center/blackout-policy [https://perma.cc/X3SR-MRNH].  
199. See Nigel Chiwaya, Blackout Blues: Major League Baseball s Broadcast Restrictions Crimp 
the Cord-Cutters, NBC NEWS (July 18, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/sports/mlb-baseball-
blackout-map-2019-2020-n1031311 [https://perma.cc/JR4Y-D9FB].  
200. See supra section II.B. 
201. OXFORD ECONS., supra note 30.  
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industry.202 However, despite these advancements, the baseball exemption 
should not be stripped away entirely. Any adopted standard must also 
consider the reliance interests of MLB and how it has conducted business 
for the past 100 years.203 
There must be a clear and discernable test for what constitutes the 
business of baseball.  The lack of a specific test for the e emption has 
created a continual e pansion, far past the point of reason. The business 
of baseball  e emption has been stretched to cover conduct that is only 
tangentially related to the actual game of baseball. Most fields of trade, 
and indeed every other professional sport, are subject to antitrust law. If 
the circuit courts produced any type of test, it is that the alleged conduct 
must be attenuated  or wholl  collateral  or incidental  to the business 
of baseball to be subject to antitrust laws.204 These tests  act more as 
vague benchmarks rather than the practical guidelines needed in this area 
of law.  
Accordingly, the test should be clear as to the definition of the 
business of baseball : onl  that conduct directl  linked to putting on 
baseball games remains exempt from antitrust law.205 Hypothetically, this 
might include pla er s contracts, which determine who is on the field 
playing baseball. It could also include agreements on where the baseball 
park is, without which the game could not go on. Right Field Rooftops 
offers an example of something that would not be covered under this new 
interpretation: advertisement would be inherently separate from the act of 
                                                 
202. Curiousl , MLB has long taken a strong stance against betting, especiall  after the Black 
So  scandal of 1919. See generally Black Sox Scandal, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Black-Sox-Scandal [https://perma.cc/DA7U-8K5S] (outlining the 
conspiracy of eight Chicago White Sox players to throw the World Series in exchange for money 
from gamblers). Recently, around the time MLB was lobbying for the invalidation of PASPA, it 
changed its tune. See Lindsey Folton, MLB Commissioner Admits the League Is Rethinking Its 
Stance on Gambling, FOX SPORTS (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.foxsports.com/mlb/story/mlb-
commissioner-admits-the-league-is-rethinking-its-stance-on-gambling-020817 
[https://perma.cc/6MJH-B5XK] (noting that MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred said the MLB is 
ree amining [its] stance on gambling  and that gambling can be a form of fan engagement  and 
fuel the popularit  of a sport ). 
203. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972) (noting the concern of retroactivity problems 
with overturning Federal Baseball). But see id. at 286 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ( To the e tent that 
there is concern over any reliance interests that club owners may assert, they can be satisfied by 
making our decision prospective onl . ). 
204. See Right Field Rooftops, LLC v. Chi. Cubs Baseball Club, LLC, 870 F.3d 682, 689 (7th Cir. 
2017), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2621 (2018); Wyckoff v. Off. of the Comm r of Baseball, 
211 F. Supp. 3d 615, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff d, 705 F. App x 26 (2d Cir. 2017). 
205. This is similar to Nathaniel Grow s conclusion, who believes that the exemption should be 
narrowed to those activities directly related to the business of providing baseball entertainment to 
the public.  Nathaniel Grow, Defining the Business of Baseball : A Proposed Framework for 
Determining the Scope of Professional Baseball s Antitrust Exemption, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 
605 (2010).  
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putting on a game of baseball.206 Similarly, merchandise may be distant 
enough from the game itself to be excluded by this test.207 These 
hypotheticals demonstrate that the direct link test should be interpreted to 
mean that the game of baseball cannot go on without the conduct 
in question.  
Whether they would pass this test or not, the reserve clause, franchising 
agreements, and certain broadcasting agreements should remain 
exempted because they are specifically mentioned in the CFA.208 The 
courts should not disturb this. This solution allows MLB to keep the 
exemption in its traditional areas of concern and would not require MLB 
to restructure its entire empire, which defeats most, if not all, reliance 
interests arguments. The only issue at stake for MLB is for conduct not 
already legislated on or adjudicated. It is only future conduct not directly 
linked to the game of baseball that would be impacted. As to the concern 
of retroactivity problems, courts could apply the test prospectively. Most 
importantly, this solution would clarify the scope of the baseball 
exemption and avoid the uncertainty of the circuit court tests.  
Both antitrust and Commerce Clause jurisprudence have changed 
significantly in the 100 years following Federal Baseball. And over the 
course of that time, the exemption has caused considerable harm.209 The 
fact that MLB continues to rely on the current state of the law remains the 
only basis for keeping the exemption.210 A practical solution addresses 
this; the exemption should not be eliminated entirely but constrained by a 
workable test. This strikes a balance between the interests of enforcement 
against unlawful trade and giving MLB the latitude it needs.211 
V. MLB S CONDUCT REGARDING SPORTS BETTING SHOULD 
BE SUBJECT TO ANTITRUST LAW 
MLB s conduct related to collectivi ing official league data for sports 
betting does not fit within a narrow baseball exemption nor a broad one. 
Selling league data is not part of the business of baseball it is a 
                                                 
206. See Right Field Rooftops, 870 F.3d at 690 91. 
207. See Grow, supra note 205, at 620.  
208. See Grow, supra note 157, at 880.  
209. See McDowell, supra note 192, at 4 (outlining the hardships minor league players face as a 
result of the reserve clause); Nathaniel Grow, Save America s Pastime Act: Special-Interest 
Legislation Epitomized, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 1014, 1015 (2019) (addressing the part of the 2018 
spending bill that excludes minor league baseball players from the Fair Labor Standards Act). 
210. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972).  
211. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 01 (1984) (explaining that sometimes 
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all ).  
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byproduct. MLB may use revenue derived from the sale of league data to 
partially fund putting on the game itself, but the generation of data is not 
directl  linked to the game. League data is not just attenuated  but wholl  
unrelated to baseball.212 Just because bets are placed on baseball games 
does not make league data directly linked to putting on baseball games. 
The exemption should not apply.  
Assuming antitrust laws apply, the AGO program could violate 
section 1 or section 2.213 If the thirty major league clubs act in concert to 
implement a joint venture with sportsbooks that harms competition, 
section 1 is implicated. If the thirty teams could be considered a single 
entity for section 1 purposes, MLB could also violate section 2 if it used 
market power to drive unauthorized data providers out of business.  
A. Single Entity Defense or Not, MLB May be Violating Section 1 or 2 
of the Sherman Act 
In response to a claim under section 1, MLB would surely argue the 
single entity defense. It is possible that American Needle precludes this 
defense because it held that the thirty-two NFL teams acted as competitors 
when selling NFL merchandise.214 MLB s sale of official league data is 
similar to the NFL s intellectual propert  in that it is another form in 
which the teams could compete against one another. The thirty MLB 
teams compete through ticket sales, merchandise, viewership, and of 
course the game itself. It is plausible that the MLB teams act as separate 
economic actors and are, if they are not acting in concert, competing 
against each other in the sale of data. 
However, despite American Needle, MLB can persuasively argue that 
it is acting as a single entity in the sale of league data. If every team sold 
data individually then sportsbooks would have to separately contract with 
thirty teams a single team s data is not useful for a bettor without the 
opposing team s data. MLB could rel  on Broadcast Music and claim that 
selling data at a centralized level lowers cost and increases efficiency a 
common economic goal.215 
A section 1 claim is dependent on separate economic actors and cannot 
apply if MLB is successful in the single entity defense.216 This is not 
prohibitive because similar evidence can support a section 2 claim for 
monopolization or attempt to monopolize.  
                                                 
212. Right Field Rooftops, LLC v. Chi. Cubs Baseball Club, LLC, 870 F.3d 682, 689 (7th Cir. 
2017), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2621 (2018). 
213. See supra section II.A. 
214. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 197 (2010). 
215. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc, 441 U.S. 1, 36 37 (1979). 
216. See Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 189 90.  
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B. MLB s Cond ct Harms Competition 
Whether the single entity defense applies or not, the AGO program 
most likely excludes competitors under either a section 1 claim that there 
is an unlawful agreement between competitors or a section 2 claim that 
MLB is leveraging its monopoly. The plaintiff or enforcement agency will 
need to show that there is harm to competition, and that no procompetitive 
justification outweighs it.217 
Mr. Gersh, the MLB-executive of gaming and new business ventures, 
practically admitted as much when he claimed that sportsbooks not using 
official game data would not be around for long. 218 The incentive is 
certainly there: MLB stands to gain $28 million a year from sale of league 
data alone.219 As the head of a multibillion-dollar industry, MLB has the 
resources to get rid of competitors. Without a competitive market to 
constrain it, the price of official league data could balloon. If enough 
suppliers of league data cannot compete, there is potential for harm to 
consumers. 
The ultimate question  for either claim remains whether MLB s 
conduct harms competition.220 In this case, the operative analysis is 
whether the AGO program substantially limits unauthorized data 
providers  opportunities to compete.221 If MLB manages to require only 
official league data by using AGOs, it would force smaller data 
competitors out of the market. Once MLB dominates the market, prices 
will most likely go up. The AGO program would also deprive sportsbooks 
of the ability to negotiate for data rights with each individual team, forcing 
them to buy data from all the teams at potentially inflated costs.  
Another aspect of the theory of harm argues that the AGO program 
deprives unauthorized data providers of distribution channels, which 
raises costs and blocks new competitors from entering the market. If all 
of the major sportsbooks are tied to the AGO program then new data 
                                                 
217. See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
218. Martin Derbyshire, Why It s Doubtful that Legal Sportsbooks Will Go Under Without MLB 
Data, PLAYUSA, https://www.playusa.com/major-league-baseball-official-data-scare-tactic/ 
[https://perma.cc/NB3E-JY2U]. Evidence of anticompetitive intent, however, is not sufficient to 
warrant an antitrust violation. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
219. See Gregory Pelnar, The Antitrust Perils of Sports Data for U.S. Sports Leagues, 2020 CPI 
ANTITRUST CHRON. 28, 31 (citing NIELSEN CO. & AM. GAMING ASS N, HOW MUCH DO LEAGUES 
STAND TO GAIN FROM LEGAL SPORTS BETTING? (2018), https://www.americangaming.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Nielsen-Research-All-4-Leagues-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/UUQ8-
UZSZ]).  
220. McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 835 (11th Cir. 2015). 
221. See id.  
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providers must prove that they are reputable to these sportsbooks as well 
as offer an attractive deal that still turns a profit. In fact, even the way 
MLB speaks on the topic can cause harm by creating an artificial fear of 
pirated  data and labeling onl  official league data as trustworth .222 All 
potential aspects of harm have the same result: inflated costs for 
the consumer. 
These claims have teeth in part because the procompetitive justification 
is so slight. Evidence that official league data is more accurate or reliable 
than non-official league data does not exist, unlike Broadcast Music 
where music composers needed a restraint on trade for market 
efficiency.223 Further, no plausible reasoning supports MLB s claim that 
it must have the league data market to itself to protect the integrit  of the 
game. 224 In fact, as history has shown, both those inside the organization 
and outside actors can compromise the integrity of the game.225 
Of course, any theory of harm would need an enforcement agency or a 
court proceeding to investigate, and it is impossible to sa  whether MLB s 
conduct is unlawful without more information. A first step would be to 
open up the possibility of any antitrust enforcement in baseball. As this is 
a 100-year-old doctrine, this first step would be a mighty one.  
CONCLUSION 
Professional baseball remains exempt from antitrust law, and case law 
resoundingly establishes that this streak will continue. Unlike when the 
Court decided Federal Baseball, baseball is no longer a quaint game 
played by friends but is instead a ten billion dollar industry. MLB takes 
advantage of the baseball exemption by keeping wages low for minor 
league players,226 forbidding teams from relocating too close to their 
current franchises,227 and enforcing territorial broadcasting restrictions, to 
name a few.228 MLB is exempt from antitrust scrutiny in these areas 
because they relate to the business of baseball.  
No court has drawn a clear line as to what conduct is in the business 
                                                 
222. Drew, supra note 9. 
223. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc, 441 U.S. 1, 33 (1979). 
224. See Drew, supra note 9.  
225. Ken Rosenthal & Evan Drellich, The Astros Stole Signs Electronically in 2017 Part of a Much 
Broader Issue for Major League Baseball, ATHLETIC (Nov. 12, 2019), 
https://theathletic.com/1363451/2019/11/12/the-astros-stole-signs-electronically-in-2017-part-of-a-
much-broader-issue-for-major-league-baseball/ [https://perma.cc/6ATS-GB7M?type=image] 
(outlining how the Houston Astros stole  the other teams  catcher s signs to the pitcher so that they 
could signal to their batter by banging on a trash can as to what the next pitch would be).  
226. See McDowell, supra note 192, at 4.  
227. See City of San Jose v. Off. of the Comm r of Baseball, 776 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 2015).  
228. See What is MLB.TV s Blackout Policy?, supra note 198. 
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of baseball  and what is not. The Supreme Court has stated it will not 
overturn Federal Baseball because of stare decisis and assumed 
congressional acquiescence. This is a mistake. The baseball exemption 
needs new constraints to be workable. The exemption should be limited 
to only conduct directly linked to putting on baseball games. This solution 
would not make MLB reorganize the entire structure of professional 
baseball and would give players and business partners some protection 
from longstanding unfair business practices.  
Specifically, collectivizing official league data used for sports betting 
is not directl  linked to the business of baseball  and should be subject 
to antitrust scrutiny. If that were the case, MLB may be violating the 
Sherman Act by excluding competitors from the market of league data. 
Because of its unique exemption from generally applicable law, MLB 
continuously expanded its monopolies for 100 years. It is time to limit the 
business of baseball.  
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